This study investigated two hypotheses regarding the mapping of perception to action during imitation. The first hypothesis predicted that as children's cognitive capacities increase the tendency to map one goal and disregard others during imitation should decrease. This hypothesis was tested by comparing the performances of 168 4-to 7-year-olds in a gestural imitation task developed by Bekkering, Wohlschläger, and Gattis. The second hypothesis predicted that reducing the mapping between perception and action should reduce the demands on the cognitive resources of the child. This hypothesis was tested by creating a condition in which perception and action overlapped by sharing objects between experimenter and child. In three experimental conditions, an adult modelled four gestures, directed at either: 1) one of two sets of round stickers (proprietary objects); 2) the same location on the table, without any sticker (no objects); or 3) one set of round stickers, which were shared with the child (shared objects). The results confirmed both hypotheses. Four-and five-year-olds imitated less accurately when imitation involved mapping of both objects and movements (proprietary and shared objects) than when imitation involved mapping movements only (no objects). Seven-year-olds imitated accurately in all three conditions, demonstrating that increased cognitive capacity allowed them to map multiple goals from perception to action. Most importantly, reducing the mapping between perception and action in the shared objects condition facilitated imitation, specifically for the transitional group, 6-year-olds. We conclude that mapping between perception and action is not direct, but resembles mapping relations in analogical reasoning: cognitive processes mediate mapping from perception to action.
movements of the self (Butterworth, 1990; Vogt, 1996) . Support for the direct mapping proposal increased following the discovery of 'mirror neurons' in the macaque monkey premotor cortex, and areas with a similar function in the human inferior frontal gyrus (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003) . Rizzolatti and colleagues reported that certain cells fire both when a specific movement is performed by a monkey, and when the monkey observes the same action performed by another individual .
Direct mapping is appealing not only because it could provide a clear physiological mechanism for mapping perception to action, but also because it appears consistent with behavioural evidence that infants can selectively match the gestures of an adult model very early in life. Meltzoff and Moore reported that infants were more likely to protrude their tongues when observing an adult model protruding the tongue than when observing a model opening and closing the mouth and vice versa (1977; 1983) . Meltzoff and Moore thus refuted Piaget's (1951) claim that connections between perception and action were not established until late in the sensorimotor period and argued that early matching behaviour provided evidence for connections between perception and action from birth onwards.
Direct mapping is not, however, consistent with several other reports of imitative behaviour during infancy and childhood. Meltzoff (1995) reported that 18-month-olds who observed an adult attempting but not completing an action (such as putting a bracelet in a cup, hanging a necklace on a peg or pulling a dumbbell apart) were just as likely to copy the whole action, including the never-observed result, as a comparison group that observed the completed actions. In a complementary study, Carpenter, Akhtar, and Tomasello (1998) found that 14-to 18-month-olds more frequently copied actions marked as intentional ('There!') than actions marked as accidental ('Woops!'). The results of these and similar studies suggest that observation does not directly activate action: infants sometimes copy more than what they see and other times copy less than what they see.
Mediated mapping refers to the proposal that the mapping between perception and action during imitation is mediated by cognitive processes. Mediated mapping is consistent with the finding that during imitation, children reproduce the intended actions of a model rather than the observed actions (Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995) .
The most clearly articulated proposal for mediated mapping is the theory of goaldirected imitation. The theory of goal-directed imitation states that: 1) the mapping of perception to action underlying imitation involves decomposing an observed action into constituent elements and then reconstructing a motor programme from those components; 2) the constituent elements guiding the deconstruction-reconstruction process are goals; 3) actions, and therefore imitations as well, involve multiple goals; 4) goals are represented hierarchically with some goals being dominant over others; and 5) processing limitations cause some goals to be selected over other goals Gattis, Bekkering, & Wohlschläger, 2002) . Bekkering et al. (2000) tested the predictions of direct mapping and mediated mapping in a gestural imitation task. Three-to six-years-old children saw a model touch her ear with her hand. The model either confined her movements to one side of the body (ipsilateral movements), using for instance her right hand to touch her right ear, or made movements that crossed over the body (contralateral movements), using for instance her right hand to touch her left ear. Children copied ipsilateral movements accurately, touching the mirror ear with the mirror hand, but copied contralateral gestures by substituting it with an ipsilateral gesture involving the mirror ear and the hand on the same side of the body as that ear.
According to the theory of goal-directed imitation, children substituted ipsilateral gestures for contralateral gestures because multiple goals such as which ear to grasp and which hand to use were competing for limited resources, and only some goals could be imitated, in this case which ear to grasp. According to this logic, children's substitution errors should be reduced if the goal set is reduced. Bekkering et al. (2000) tested this claim in two further experiments. In one experiment, the model demonstrated just two gestures, one ipsilateral and another contralateral but involving the same ear. Bekkering, Wohlschläger, and Gattis reasoned that reducing the gesture set held the object goal constant and reduced the number of competing goals. The results confirmed their hypothesis: when the 'ear' goal was held constant by demonstrating gestures to just one ear, children mirrored both gestures accurately.
In a further test of the predictions of goal-directed imitation, the size of the goal set was manipulated by varying the context of the gestures. The experimenter sat at a table across from a child and modelled four gestures directed at two points on the table, one on the right side of space between adult and child, and the other on the left side of space between adult and child. Two of the gestures were ipsilateral (e.g. right hand to the right space and left hand to the left space) and two were contralateral (e.g. left hand to the right space and right hand to the left space). One half of the children saw gestures directed at two small stickers on the table and the other half saw gestures directed at the same two locations, but without the stickers. According to the theory of goal-directed imitation, the stickers' condition involves more goals, because the stickers are objects, and competition between goals leads to more errors. The results were consistent with this prediction: in the stickers' condition, children who had their own set of two stickers, touched the mirror sticker, but they often substituted an ipsilateral movement when the model had used a contralateral movement (Figure 1 ). In contrast, when no objects were present in the context, children mirrored both ipsi-and contralateral gestures accurately. Similar findings have been reported with 3-year-olds (Gleissner, Meltzoff, & Bekkering, 2000) and with 12-and 18-month-olds (Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005) .
The aim of the present study was to test two hypotheses about the mapping of perception to action during imitation. The first hypothesis was that age-related limitations on cognitive resources were the cause of the imitation errors observed by Bekkering et al. (2000) . Bekkering et al. (2000) . (1) No objects condition with a child performing a mirror contra-lateral gesture and (2) Proprietary Objects condition with a child performing a movement substitution.
After 6 years of age, there is a steep increase in cognitive processing abilities. By this age, children develop the ability to process multiple relations jointly (Halford, 1993) . For example, in a reasoning task, children ordered elements according to a given number of premises (e.g. A . B; B . C; and C . D). Some elements were adjacent (e.g. B and C), others were non-adjacent (e.g. B and D): ordering two non-adjacent elements requires the simultaneous processing of two premises (B . C and C . D). Six-year-olds performed better than younger age groups when the elements to be ordered were nonadjacent, demonstrating increased abilities to process multiple relations (Andrews & Halford, 1998) . Furthermore, between 6 and 7 years, working memory capacity increases (Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridgen, & Wearing, 2004) : at this age, children become able to keep track of three information units in working memory, instead of just two (Johnson, Fabian, & Pascual-Leone, 1989; Morra, Moizo, & Scopesi, 1988) . Increased capacity and efficiency of working memory is in-turn considered important for the development of analogical reasoning (Halford, 1993) .
We reasoned that if limited cognitive capacities are responsible for errors in mapping perception to action in imitation, when children's cognitive capacities increase with age, they should become able to track and reproduce multiple goals. To test this hypothesis, we tested children aged between 4 and 7 years in an experimental paradigm similar to that devised by Bekkering et al. (2000) , in which a model directed four gestures at locations on a table. Although Bekkering and colleagues tested 3-to 6-year-olds, results were collapsed across age rather than analysed within specific age groups, thus not permitting the analysis of developmental change. A study from the paediatric neuropsychology literature reported that movement substitution errors in imitation decrease steadily and virtually disappear between 8 and 14 years (Wapner & Cirillo, 1968) . It is therefore likely that developmental changes will be evidenced between 4 and 7 years.
The second hypothesis was that reducing the demands on limited cognitive resources would facilitate the deconstruction-reconstruction process. We tested this hypothesis by creating a third condition in which objects were shared between child and experimenter ( Figure 2 ). We considered that the mapping process in imitation may resemble the mapping process in analogical reasoning. In imitation, the perception of others' acts directed at objects can be mapped on to the execution of one's own acts on objects. This process can be similar to the way in which relations from a domain are used to learn about novel problems in analogical reasoning. Namely, imitation would involve establishing a relation between the elements involved in perception and execution of acts (e.g. other's hand ! own hand) as well as mapping the relation between elements in perception and action. If this is the case, as analogical reasoning is facilitated by increasing the similarity between objects in different domains, one way to reduce the demands on limited cognitive resources would be to reduce the mapping by making the objects involved in perception and action overlap. We reasoned that reducing the mapping between perception and action by eliminating the need to map the relation between the model's set of objects and the child's set of objects would facilitate mapping and enable children to imitate other goals. Carpenter et al. (2005) used a similar condition in their study of infants: 12-and 18-month-olds saw an adult either push a mouse towards one of two symmetrically disposed toy-houses or saw the adult push the toy towards corresponding locations on the table. In the former condition, the experimenter and the infant pushed the mouse towards the same toy-house, which thus acted as a shared target object between the observed action of the adult and the infant's motor action. In this condition, infants copied the target location correctly but failed to reproduce other goals, such as the particular style of the action. However, infants' limited cognitive resources meant that they had difficulties mapping more than one aspect of the actions at a time: for example, in the other condition where targets were not present, infants did imitate the action style but failed to reproduce the location of the movement.
Method
Participants Participants were 168 (72 females) children recruited from schools and nurseries in a town in the UK. Participants did not have any known impairment or disability. The age range was from 3 years and 7 months to 7 years and 6 months. Children were divided in four age groups: 1) 4-year-olds, range 3:7 to 4:6; 2) 5-year-olds, range 4:7 to 5:6; 3) 6-yearolds, range 5:7 to 6:6; and 4) 7-year-olds, range 6:7 to 7:6. Twenty additional children were not considered in the final sample because they refused to participate (N ¼ 13), did not complete the test (N ¼ 4) or because their trials were not video-recorded due to experimenter errors (N ¼ 3). The resulting distribution of participants by condition and age group is reported in Table 1 .
Experimental design and procedure A male experimenter tested each child individually. The testing took place in a room or corner of the participants' nursery or school and was recorded with a digital video-camera. The experimenter and infant sat facing each other at a child-sized table.
After a brief familiarization period, the experimenter administered an assessment of hand preference (Gleissner et al., 2000) . One point was given for each action performed with the right hand, but because not all children performed all the actions in the battery, percentages were calculated on the total of items completed, with 0% indicating strong left-handedness and 100% indicating strong right-handedness. After the handedness assessment, the experimenter began the main experimental procedure. Within each age group, participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions.
Proprietary Objects. In the proprietary objects condition, experimenter and child sat at a table with four green stickers (1 inch diameter). Two were in front of the experimenter (30 cm from the child's side of the table), and two were in front of the child (20 cm from the child's side of the table). The experimenter touched the two stickers in front of him individually with his right hand or his left hand, for a total of four gestures: right ipsilateral, left ipsilateral, right contralateral and left contralateral. We expected this condition to lead to the most substitution errors overall, as reported in Bekkering et al. (2000) , except for older children. For older children, we expected to observe a significant decrease of substitution errors in line with trends evidenced in older children (Wapner & Cirillo, 1968) .
No Objects. In this condition, the experimenter displayed the same four gestures to the same four locations, but no stickers were on the table, thus eliminating objects from the goal set. We expected this condition to lead to the least substitution errors overall, as reported in Bekkering et al. (2000) , even for the youngest children.
Shared Objects. This condition resembled the other two in all respects except that just two stickers were on the table, so that the objects of action were shared between experimenter and child. The stickers were easily within reach for both experimenter and child (20 cm from the child's side of the table). We expected that children would make fewer errors in this condition relative to the proprietary objects condition, because the sharing of objects meant that the mapping between perception and action was reduced.
In each experimental condition, the experimenter invited the child to 'do what I do' and demonstrated the four gestures described above. The block of four gestures was repeated four times, with an assigned order of the gestures randomized within each block. If a child did not respond to a gesture, the experimenter modelled the gesture again, saying 'Do what I do' up to a maximum of three times.
Coding
An undergraduate scorer blind to the hypotheses of the study scored infants' responses for each gesture modelled. Responses considered were right and left ipsi-and contralateral gestures of the child.
If children displayed more than one gesture in response to the model, only the final gesture was considered for analysis. Initial responses disregarded from analysis represented a single false start that children corrected immediately and spontaneously. Similar false starts were, however, very rare occurring only on 2.3% of the total number of trials. A second coder scored performance of at least 20% of the participants from each age group, approximately distributed equally across conditions, for a total of 41 participants (24%) scored. The agreement was optimal: Cohen's k in the four age groups ranged from 0.94 to 1.00.
Correct responses were mirror gestures whereby the child copied the model's ipsior contralateral gesture and reached the location or object on the same side as the model. Errors were divided in three categories (see Want & Gattis, 2005) : 1) Movement Substitution, when a child chose the mirror object or location but a different arm movement (e.g. ipsilateral instead of contralateral); 2) Location Substitution, when a child chose the mirror arm but a different object or location; 3) Movement and Location Substitution, when a child chose a different arm and a different location.
Results
Each child was presented with 16 gestures and thus the frequency of each category of responses ranged from 0 to 16. Preliminary analysis revealed that there was no effect of handedness, Fð2; 163Þ ¼ 0:58, p ¼ :56, revealing that the pattern of results was not affected by hand bias, nor was there an effect of sex, Fð1; 166Þ ¼ 2:13, p ¼ :15. In subsequent analyses, the data were therefore collapsed across handedness and sex. In all subsequent analyses, we used non-parametric statistics because they seemed more appropriate for the data collected due to strongly asymmetric distributions.
The frequencies of the responses collapsed across age and conditions revealed that children made more mirror responses (72%) than non-mirror responses (M ¼ 11:59; SD ¼ 4:13). The most frequent error was movement substitution (M ¼ 2:42; SD ¼ 2:39) while the frequency of other errors was much lower: M ¼ 1:52 (SD ¼ 2:03) for location substitution; M ¼ 0:48 (SD ¼ 1:30) for movement and location substitution.
Ipsilateral vs. contralateral trials
To test whether ipsilateral gestures were mirrored more frequently than contralateral gestures, the frequencies of mirror responses to ipsi-and contralateral gestures were collapsed across age and experimental conditions. The results demonstrated that more mirror responses were performed in ipsilateral (M ¼ 
Effect of objects
To test whether goal competition affects performance, we considered whether the number of objects in the setting decreased the likeliness of correct mirror responses. For this purpose, we collapsed the data across different age groups and compared the frequencies of responses of participants in the three experimental conditions.
Results revealed a significant difference between the frequency of mirror responses in the no objects condition when compared with the shared objects and the proprietary objects condition (Table 2) , Kruskal-Wallis test ¼ 16:11, p , :001. Children mirrored more frequently in the no objects condition when compared with both the shared objects condition (Mann-Whitney U ¼ 1; 027:5; p , :01) and the proprietary objects condition (Mann-Whitney U ¼ 904:0; p , :001). No differences were observed between shared and proprietary objects (Mann-Whitney U ¼ 1; 585:0; p ¼ :96).
Complementary patterns of results were also observed considering the frequency of movement substitutions.
Age effects
We also compared the frequencies of mirror responses in the different conditions within each age group. Average frequencies of mirror responses are reported in Table 3 and Figure 3 .
The first two age groups displayed analogous patterns of results: children imitated more accurately in the no objects condition than in the proprietary or shared objects condition. Four-year-olds mirrored more often in the no objects condition than in the shared objects condition, Mann-Whitney U ¼ 7:0, p , :01, and the proprietary objects condition, U ¼ 14:0, p ¼ :055 (one-tailed test), while children from this age group in Figure 3 . Mirror responses. Average of mirror responses by age group and condition (significant differences are flagged).
the shared and proprietary objects conditions did not differ in their mirror responses, U ¼ 19:0; p ¼ :29. Five-year-olds imitated more accurately in the no objects condition than in the shared objects condition, U ¼ 36:5; p , :001, and the proprietary objects condition, U ¼ 51.5; p , .01. Again, there was no difference between errors in the two conditions with objects, U ¼ 103:5, p ¼ :71.
In contrast, 7-year-olds were equally accurate in all three conditions: the frequency of mirror responses of children in this age group did not differ across conditions (Kruskal-Wallis test ¼ 2:45; p ¼ :29).
Compared to the other groups, 6-year-olds displayed a distinctive pattern of results. Six-year-olds were equally accurate in the no objects and in the shared objects condition (U ¼ 108:0; p ¼ :16), while they imitated less accurately in the proprietary objects condition than in the no objects (U ¼ 33:5; p , :01) and the shared objects condition (U ¼ 76:0; p , :05).
These patterns of results were confirmed by comparisons between age groups conducted within each experimental condition. The frequency of mirror responses in the no objects condition did not change significantly between age groups (Kruskal-Wallis test ¼ 6:79, p ¼ :08): Four-year-olds, although less accurate, did not differ significantly from 7-year-olds in mirroring gestures when there were no objects in the setting, U ¼ 41:0, p ¼ :24. The number of mirror responses in the shared objects condition increased significantly with age (Kruskal-Wallis test ¼ 13:52, p , :01), most notably at 6 years. Conversely, in the proprietary objects condition, imitation performance did not increase until 7 years (the comparison between mirror responses at 6 and 7 years in this condition yielded U ¼ 52:0, p , :01).
Discussion
We tested children between 4 and 7 years in a gestural imitation task to investigate whether 1) children's imitation performance increases as their cognitive capacities increase with age and 2) sharing objects reduces the demands on cognitive resources and thereby leads to improved imitation performance. The results support both hypotheses.
We hypothesized that errors in imitation of multiple goals, such as the substitution errors reported by Bekkering et al. (2000) , could be attributed to limitations in children's ability to retain and reproduce more than one goal. The results of this study are consistent with this hypothesis. Four-, five-and six-year-olds imitated less accurately when imitation involved mapping objects and movements from perception to action. Conversely, 7-yearolds imitated just as accurately when imitation involved both mappings as when it involved mapping movements alone. We attribute this difference in the ability to retain and reproduce multiple goals during imitation to an increase in working memory and processing capacity between 6 and 7 years (Andrews & Halford, 1998; Halford, 1993; Johnson et al., 1989; Morra, Moizo, & Scopesi, 1988) . Our findings of increasing accuracy in imitative performance between 6 and 7 years is also consistent with results from the paediatric neuropsychology literature that report the disappearance of imitation substitution errors in later childhood (Wapner & Cirillo, 1968) .
The most important result was that reducing the mapping between perception and action by creating a shared objects condition facilitated imitation. Reducing the mapping between perception and action did not, however, facilitate imitation at every age. The youngest children performed similarly in the shared objects condition and the proprietary objects condition, and the oldest children performed similarly in all three conditions. Sharing objects had the strongest impact on performance for 6-year-olds.
Six-year-olds performed similarly in the shared objects condition and the no objects condition, but performed less well in the proprietary objects condition.
We propose that sharing objects facilitates imitation specifically at 6 years because this is a transitional age: around the sixth year there is a significant developmental transition in children's capacity to retain information in working memory (Halford, 1993; Siegler, 1989) , which facilitates the task of mapping relations from one representation to another. Sharing objects, much like sharing appearances in analogies, facilitates the mapping overall (Gentner, 1988; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Halford, 1993; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) .
These results suggest a similarity between analogical reasoning and imitation. Both imitation and analogical reasoning involve mapping a relationship between objects in different domains based on correspondences between the elements in the two domains. In the hand-to-dot task, children are to understand the analogy between the other's action directed at one goal in the perceptual domain and their own actions towards goals in execution. We reasoned that if this is the case, one way to reduce the demands on mapping was to create an overlap between objects in the perceptual and action domain. In accordance with our hypothesis of a similarity between analogical reasoning and imitation, we observed only a facilitative effect of the shared objects condition at an age when children increase their ability to process multiple relationships across domains simultaneously. Children younger than 6-years-old still display difficulties in processing relations between three objects (in our study: own hand, object and other's hand) that are increasingly overcome by 6 years (Halford, 1993) . Both imitation and analogical reasoning show age-related improvements at similar points in development (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995) Overall, these results confirm the mediated mapping view of imitation. The mapping between perception and action is not direct, but is mediated by cognitive processes and capacity limitations on these processes lead to errors in imitation. This claim is supported by three pieces of evidence. First, children imitate identical actions differently, depending on the context of those actions. In our data, younger children's imitative performance was influenced by the presence or absence of objects in the imitative setting. Second, imitation performance depends on age. In our data, older children with greater processing capacity performed equally well in all imitative contexts, demonstrating that they were able to map multiple goals from perception to action. Finally, creating a context in which perception and action overlap facilitates imitative performance, specifically at the transitional age of six when processing capacity is beginning to increase.
Future studies might further investigate the parallel between imitation, cognitive processing and analogical reasoning. For example, it would be of interest to consider relations between individual differences in cognitive processing abilities (e.g. quantitative measures of working memory capacity, or analogical reasoning tasks) and imitative performance in multiple-goal tasks. Such investigations would provide further insight into the influence of cognitive capacity on mapping goals in imitation.
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